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The Undue Burden:
Parental Notification Requirements for
Publicly Funded Contraception
Stephanie Bornsteint
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, with virtually no media coverage, the House of Representa-
tives passed the Parental Notification Act of 1998 (the Act),' a bill that
for the first time would require public clinics to notify the parents of
teenagers before providing them with contraception. The Act would
amend Title X of the Public Health Service Act (Title X),2 which has
provided the majority of federal funding to family planning agencies and
clinics, including health departments, hospitals, and Planned Parenthood
branches, since its passage in 1970. 3 The amendment would require all
Title X organizations to provide written notice to parents of any minor
seeking contraception unless the minor has obtained a court's permission
to bypass parental notification. 4 The Act would also require Title X orga-
nizations to inform all minors about the benefits of abstinence and the
dangers of being coerced into sexual acts, and would require the organiza-
tions to comply with all state laws on reporting of child sexual abuse and
statutory rape. 5 After the House passed the Act but before the Act went
on to the Senate or became law, its sponsors, fearing a presidential veto,
C 2000, THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
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1. H.R. 4721, 105th Cong. (1998).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq. (1998).
3. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Issues in Brief: The U.S. Family Planning Program Faces Chal-
lenges and Change (1998) (visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ib3.html>. While
Title X was the original source of federal funding for contraceptive services, there are currently
several other sources of federal funding, including Title XX and Title IVA. See infra note 15.
4. See Parental Notification Act of 1998, H.R. 4721, 105th Cong. (1998).
5. See id.
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tabled the bill for the remainder of the legislative session, with the inten-
tion of raising such a bill in the future.6
One year later, in the fall of 1999, sponsors of the 1998 Act again
proposed an amendment to Title X requiring parental notification for
minors to obtain contraception, yet dropped their proposal in exchange
for support for another bill that increased funding for abstinence educa-
tion by fifty million dollars.7 This abstinence education bill was approved
by the House Appropriations Committee with no objections.8 One com-
mentator suggests that this compromise came, in part, in response to
pressure from House Republican leaders to avoid attaching "contentious
social issue riders" to spending bills in order to "highlight spending differ-
ences" between Republicans and President Clinton in the year 2000.9 Yet
instead of "fret[ting] about an amendment he could not offer," one spon-
sor of the unsuccessful 1998 Act claims he "'took a constructive ap-
proach . . . focus[ing] on abstinence promotion,"' noting that "'[i]f you
can't make progress in one area, you can make progress in another."' 10
Because a parental notification requirement for contraception has gained
increasing congressional support in each of the last three years, it is pos-
sible that next year or shortly thereafter, a bill similar to the 1998 Paren-
tal Notification Act will pass through the Senate and, barring presidential
veto, become law."
This article starts from the assumption that a parental notification
requirement for publicly funded contraception would have a devastating
impact on sexually active minors, greatly increasing their risk of un-
wanted pregnancy, as well as HIV infection and other sexually transmitted
diseases. Depending on the particular statute, parental notification re-
quires the minor to prove that one or both parents or guardians were in-
formed before the minor can receive family planning services, while
parental consent requires that one or both parents agree to allow the mi-
nor to obtain services. 12 Despite this difference, "the mere threat of un-
6. See Steve Stanek, House OKs Notification of Parents Bill; Its Thin Margin Won't Defeat Veto,
Cm. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1998, at 5.
7. See Joan Lowy, Abstinence Programs to Receive Federal Ai, DESERET NEws, Oct. 18, 1999, at
A6; Teenage Pregnancy Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 1636, 106th Cong. (1999); Health Care As-
surance Act of 1999, S. 24, 106th Cong. § 406, (1999); S. 1458, 106th Cong. (1999).
8. See Lowy, supra note 7.
9. See Abortion Foes Express Few Regrets Over Rider Strategy, NAT'L J.'s CONGRESS DAILY, Nov.
16, 1999.
10. Id. (quoting Representative Ernest Istook (R-Okla.)).
11. See Stanek, supra note 6.
12. See, e.g., MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12s (West 1999); MoN. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204
(1999); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1999). Courts seem to believe
that there is a significant difference in the burden that this imposes on a minor. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511 (1990) (noting the "greater intrusive-
ness of consent statutes"); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 at 411 n. 17 (1981) (stating that "notice
statutes are not equivalent to consent statutes because [notice statutes] do not give anyone a veto
power"). Family planning advocates suggest, however, that the practical reality of a notification
requirement can be as burdensome on a minor as a consent requirement because of the chilling
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welcome parental involvement in the minor's contraceptive decision is
likely to have a significant deterrent effect on a minor's use of Title X
clinics."' 3 Many factors affect a minor's choice to involve her parents in
her reproductive decisionmaking;' 4 nevertheless, conditioning contracep-
tive options upon parental involvement would have the greatest impact
on minority and low-income teenage women, who are more likely to get
their contraception from publicly funded clinics than their more affluent
counterparts. Studies show that each year, Title X funds provide services
for over four million people "who would otherwise be unable to afford
family planning," and that Title X clients are "predominantly young and
poor.' 15 Title X-funded clinics are the only providers of family planning
effect whenever a minor must involve her parents in her reproductive decision. See Brenda D.
Hofman, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution and Constitutional Implications-Burdening the
Minor's Rights of Privacy, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1325, 1343-44 (discussing the difference between
parental notification and parental consent requirements, and noting that "because contraception
implies a continuing pattern of activity which may be subject to parental restriction beyond the
initial visit to the clinic, notification in the context of contraception more closely resembles the
kind of deterrence to parental approval that consent provisions mandate"); see also Stanley K.
Henshaw, The Impact of Requirements for Parental Consent on Minors' Abortions in Mississippi,
27 FAm. PLAN. PERsp. 120, 122 (1995) (comparing respective effects on state teenage abortion
statistics of a Mississippi consent statute and a Minnesota notification statute, including increased
out-of-state and second-trimester abortions).
13. Hofnan, supra note 12, at 1342. In her discussion, Hofman notes that "[a]ccording to the courts,
statistical evidence and logic indicated that such intrusive notification requirements [for contra-
ception] would deter adolescents from using Title X clinics," and that
[miost adolescents denied confidential access to Title X services would be unable
to obtain adequate contraceptive care from alternative sources because of the
prohibitively high cost of obtaining prescription contraceptives from a private phy-
sician[] and because nonprescription contraceptives which may be obtained rela-
tively inexpensively from a drugstore are, as a practical matter, 'significantly less
effective than prescription contraceptives.'
Id at 1332-33, 1332-33 n.46-48 (citations omitted). Hofnan also cites a 1980 study on the deter-
rent effects of requiring parental notification for contraception, supporting the notion that such
deterrence would result not in abstinence but in less effective contraceptive methods:
When 1211 teenagers were surveyed concerning their likely reaction to such
mandatory notification requirements, 23% responded that they would stop attend-
ing the clinics .... When 641,000 sexually active teenagers were asked what al-
ternatives they would resort to if effective contraceptives became unavailable,
87,000 said they would 'switch to nonprescription methods, including withdrawal
and rhythm, which have been shown to have relatively high failure rates,' and an-
other 26,000 said that they would continue to be sexually active without using any
method.
Id. at 1357 (citing Aida Torres et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of
Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 287, 290, 291 (1980)).
14. Cf. Robert Win. Blum et al., Factors Associated with the Use of Court Bypass for Minors to Obtain
Abortions, 22 FA.M. PLAN. PERSP. 158, 160 (1990) (noting, under a Minnesota abortion law requir-
ing two-parent notification, the many factors, including age and economic status, influencing a
teen's decision not to notify one-or both parents and instead use the judicial bypass option.)
15. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Fact Sheet, America 's Family Planning Program:
Title X (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/FAMILY
PLANNINGISSUES/TitleX fact.html>. I do not mean to conflate Title X funding with all fed-
eral funding for contraception. Indeed, while Title X was the original source of federal funding
for adolescent contraceptive services, in recent years numerous federal laws have created other
sources of funding, including Title XX and Title IVA. For a description of these, see generally
LEIGHTON Ku, HENRY J. KAISER FAMY FOUNDATION, URBAN INST. AND CHILD TiRNDs, INC.,
FINANCING FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES: PUBLICLY SUPPORTED FAmiLY PLANNING N THE UNITED
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services for approximately 80% of the women who use them. 16 A teenage
woman who is sexually active but does not use contraceptives has a 90%
chance of becoming pregnant within one year of such activity,' 7 and low-
income teens "account for 73% of women aged 15-19 who get pregnant,
even though they make up only 38% of all women in that age group. ' ' 8
Most notably, as Title X applies to teenagers, studies showed that
1,815,370 women in the United States aged thirteen to nineteen were
served by publicly funded contraception in one year,' 9 and that publicly
funded family planning services are estimated to prevent 385,800 unin-
tended pregnancies to teenage women between the ages of fifteen and
nineteen annually, that would otherwise result in 154,700 births and
183,300 abortions.20 A full analysis of the impact of a parental notifica-
tion requirement for publicly funded contraception is beyond the scope of
this article. Assuming that the results of such a requirement are not desir-
able, this article focuses on a legal analysis of the likelihood that such a
requirement may pass through the legislature and be upheld by the courts
in the future.
The House of Representatives' passage of the Parental Notification
Act of 1998 was a symbol of the change that has occurred in the legisla-
tive and judicial vision of adolescent privacy rights since the passage of
Title X in 1970. When viewed broadly, the path to the 1998 Act began
twenty years ago, in 1978, when a similar parental notification amend-
ment was proposed and defeated in the House as clearly contrary to the
original congressional intent behind Title X-preventing teenage preg-
nancy.2' A few years later, in 1981, Congress passed an amendment to
Title X, directing funded entities to "encourage family participation" in
the services they provided,22 which the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") attempted to interpret as authorizing the imposition of
a parental notification requirement. Known as the "squeal rule" by its op-
STATES (1993). 1 contend, however, that if a parental notification requirement could be upheld
for Title X funding, all other sources of federal funding for contraception would be susceptible
to the same analysis and requirements.
16. See Fact Sheet, America's Family Planning Program, supra note 15 (citing Lisa Kaeser et al.,
Title Xat 25: Balancing National Family Planning Needs with State Flexibility, Alan Guttmacher
Institute (1996)).
17. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Facts in Brief Teen Sex and Pregnancy (visited Jan. 1, 2000)
<http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ib5.html> (citation omitted).
18. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Issues in Brief Teenage Pregnancy and the Welfare Reform Debate
(visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ib5.html>.
19. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Issues in Brief Contraception Counts: State-by-State Information
(last modified Aug. 1999) <http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ib22.html>.
20. See Planned Parenthood Federation of America, supra note 15 (citing Jacqueline Forrest &
Renee Samara, Impact of Publicly Funded Contraceptive Services on Unintended Pregnancies
and Implications for Medicaid Expenditures, 28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 188 (1996)).
21. See 124 CONG. REC. H37,044 (1978); Planned Parenthood v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658, 668
(D.C. Dist. 1983) (noting how confidentiality is essential to the success of family planning clin-
ics).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1998), Hist. & Stat. Note 1981.
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ponents, this HHS interpretive regulation mandating parental notification
was struck down by the federal courts as similarly contravening the con-
gressional intent behind Title X.
23
As the courts recognized, while Congress agreed that reducing teen-
age pregnancy was an important end of Title X,2 4 the disagreement over
the means to that end became apparent in the wake of these early battles
over parental notification for contraception. In the 1970s, largely due to
a perceived "epidemic" of teenage pregnancy, Congress passed and ex-
panded Title X to provide lower-income women and adolescents access to
contraception.25 In the late 1970s and early 1980s a tension developed
between the liberal means for reducing teenage pregnancy-providing ac-
cess to contraception and information-and the conservative means to
the same end--encouraging abstinence and parental involvement.26 This
tension resulted in a confused dual governmental strategy to reduce teen-
age pregnancy in the 1980s: the legislature attempted both to provide
teens access to contraception and to involve parents in their children's
sexual decisions; the court attempted to balance the privacy rights of mi-
nors with the authoritarian interests of parents and the state.27 Then,
throughout the 1990s, the conservative strategy of reducing teenage sex-
ual activity by involving parents gained preeminence, as evidenced by
legislative and judicial movements toward increasing parental involve-
ment in teenage pregnancy and abortion.2
In addition to specific laws relating to contraception and abortion
for minors, during the mid-1980s, conservatives began a separate and par-
allel legal approach also designed to reduce teenage pregnancy by reducing
teenage sexual activity: criminalizing consensual adolescent sexual be-
havior through the laws governing child abuse and statutory rape.2 9 State
governments attempted to treat consensual sexual activity among young
adolescents as child sexual abuse, regardless of the age of the sexual part-
ner or the voluntariness of the behavior.30 Then, in the 1990s, state
23. See Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 656-63 (D.C. Cir. 1983); New York v. Heck-
ler, 719 F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (2d Cir. 1983); Patricia Olah, The "Squeal Rule" anda Minor's Right
to Privacy, 12 HOFSTA L. REv. 497, 497-98 (1984).
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra Part I.C.
25. See KRISTIN LuKER, DuBiouS CONCEPTIONS, THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY 59-64, 81
(1996); H.R. REP. No. 91-1472, Pub. L. No. 91-572 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068.
26. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 76; Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem ": Welfare
Reform and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 121 (1998).
27. See FRANKLIN E. ZtmNG, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE vii-viii, 7-8 (1982);
Linda Himnelfarb, The "Squeal Rule" Revisited, Doe v. Blum, 51 BRooK. L. REv. 704, 705
(1985); Shelby Hargrave Cook, The Unresolved Crisis: The Federal Government's Search for an
Adolescent Pregnancy Policy, 49, 88-91, 111-12 (1986) (unpublished dissertation, University of
Maryland, 1986) (on file at Univ. Microfilms Int'l, Ann Arbor, MI).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part 111.
30. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Van de Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (Ct. App. 1986) (dis-
cussing the Attorney General's opinion that California's Child Abuse Reporting law should apply
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prosecutors dusted off statutory rape laws that had become all but obsolete
and increased the prosecution of statutory rape in an attempt to reduce
unwed teenage pregnancy and welfare dependence, while simultaneously
increasing paternal child support.3'
With its provisions for both parental notification and enforced
compliance with state child sexual abuse and rape reporting laws, the Pa-
rental Notification Act of 1998 represents the culmination and merger of
these two conservative strategies. As this article will argue, nearly two
decades after Congress rejected a parental notification amendment to Ti-
tle X and the courts struck down the HHS "squeal rule," the sponsors of
the 1998 Act are attempting to pass a parental notification amendment
to Title X that will succeed in Congress while satisfying the concerns of
federal courts. Given the shift in the legislative vision of how to reduce
teenage pregnancy and twenty years of court precedent increasingly re-
stricting minors' independent access to abortion, if Congress were to pass
an amendment to Title X similar to the 1998 Act, such an amendment
would likely be upheld in the courts. The sponsors of the Act shaped its
statutory language to mirror the numerous Supreme Court opinions up-
holding parental consent laws for abortion, crafting a model for a future
parental notification requirement that would likely survive constitutional
challenge.32
This article will analyze the possibility that a parental notification
requirement for minors seeking publicly funded contraception may soon
become a reality. Part I of this article will explore the history of Title X
and some of its amendments, the HHS interpretive "squeal rule," and the
federal courts' rejection of the HHS rule based on the congressional intent
behind Title X. Part II will focus on the Parental Notification Act of
1998 and its likelihood for success against a constitutional challenge,
based on an analysis of precedent on parental consent requirements for
contraception and abortion. Finally, Part III will discuss the change in the
legislative and judicial vision of adolescent privacy rights over time, from
a more expansive notion of adolescents as individuals with rights to a
more restrictive notion of adolescents as children subject to their parents'
rights. The article will conclude by touching upon some other recent
trends that reveal this narrowing view of minors' privacy rights, including
an increase in statutory rape prosecution during the last decade.
to all sexual activity, even if voluntary, while ultimately holding that the law did not impose such
a requirement).
31. See Weinstein, supra note 26, at 124, 127, 136-39.
32. See infra Part lI.B.
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I. PAST EFFORTS: TITLE X AND THE "SQUEAL RULE"
A. Early History of Title X: Legislating Access
to Contraception for Minors
1. Congressional Intent Behind Title X, 1970-1978
In 1970, Congress amended the Public Health Service Act of 1944
by adding Title X, a subchapter entitled Population Research and Volun-
tary Family Planning Programs. 3 3 The congressional purpose behind Title
X was, in part, to "make comprehensive voluntary family planning serv-
ices readily available to all persons desiring such services" and to "make
readily available information on family planning. 3 4 Title X established
federal grants to public or nonprofit organizations to provide family
planning services and information to the public, particularly lower-
income women and families. 3' The law was designed to enhance signifi-
cantly "the provision of services to all those who want them but cannot
afford them. 36 While the statute did not specifically mention serving
adolescents, programs funded by Title X became a major provider of fam-
ily planning services for teens. In 1970, the year the statute was passed,
approximately 380,000 adolescent girls visited Title X clinics. 37 In fact,
as the courts later found, because of the statute's broad and all-inclusive
language, "Title X grantees .. .served the teenage population from the
inception of the program. 38
By the mid 1970s, politicians and policymakers believed there was a
full-fledged and steadily growing "epidemic" of teenage sexual activity and
pregnancy. 39 This belief was attributable in part to a 1976 report by the
Alan Guttmacher Institute, a reproductive policy research organization,
which estimated that in the United States, eleven of the twenty-one mil-
lion teenagers between the ages of fifteen and nineteen, and 1.6 of the
eight million thirteen and fourteen year-olds had engaged in sexual inter-
33. See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068; see also 42 U.S.C. §300 (1998).
34. H.R. REP. No. 91-1472, Pub. L. No. 91-572 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5075-76 (em-
phasis added).
35. See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5069-70; see also 42 U.S.C. §300(a) (1998).
36. H.R. REP. No. 91-1472, Pub. L. No. 91-572 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5075.
37. See Cook, supra note 27, at 9-10 (citing Alan Guttmacher Institute, Data Files from National Re-
porting System for Family Planning Services, NCHS AND AGI SURVEYs OF FAMIY PLANNING
AGENCIES (1970)).
38. Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d. 650, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
39. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 60-64, 72, 81; see also Cook, supra note 27, at 10-12, 17-21, 36.
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACEPTION 47
course.4 0 This sexual activity resulted in an estimated one million preg-
nancies among fifteen to nineteen year-olds, and 30,000 pregnancies
among girls under fifteen annually.41 While there had not been a signifi-
cant jump in the rate of teenage sexual activity or teenage pregnancy,
many policymakers found the mere quantification of existing statistics
shocking. 2 Patterns of teenage pregnancy among Caucasian teens had
begun to mirror those of minority teens, 43 a reality which also may have
served to catch the attention of politicians.
In addition to quantifying the scope of the problem, the Guttmacher
report demonstrated the crucial role that Title X played in providing con-
traceptive services to teenagers. By 1975, the number of teenagers served
by family planning clinics had grown to 1.1 million annually,44 teenagers
comprised thirty percent of Title X clinics' caseload nationally, 45 and
Title X clinics had become the largest provider of health services to teens
in the United States.46 Yet the report also revealed that six years after
the creation of Title X, "[t]hree in 10 teens said access to contraceptives
was a 'major problem,"' and one of the main reasons teenagers gave for
not using contraception was that "contraceptives were not available when
they needed them. 47
In 1978, Congress clarified its intention to provide family planning
services to adolescents under Title X by amending the law to include spe-
cifically "services for adolescents" among the "broad range of . family
planning methods and services" its projects offered.48 In addition to the
plain language of the statutory amendment, the Senate Report on refi-
nancing and amending Title X revealed Congress' intent to serve adoles-
cents, stating that Title X clinics had been "particularly effective in
meeting the needs of . . . young persons under 20 years of age.",49 The
Senate Report also reflects an understanding of the importance of the
40. See ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 11 MILLION TEENAGERS, WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE
EPIDEMIC OF ADOLESCENT PREGNANCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1976) [hereinafter
GuTTMAcHER, II MILLION TEENAGERS].
41. See id. at 10.
42. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 81; see also JOiHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 96-100 (2nd ed. 1995).
43. The Guttmacher report reflects this attitude:
Adolescent sexual activity has been traditionally portrayed as principally affecting
minorities and the poor; but recent evidence suggests that teenagers from higher
income and nonminority groups are now beginning sexual intercourse at earlier
ages, leading to higher rates of sexual activity and greater risk of unwanted preg-
nancy for teenagers generally.
GUTTMACHER, 11 MILLION TEENAGERS, supra note 40, at 9.
44. See id. at 44; Cook, supra note 27, at 20 (citing Alan Guttmacher Institute, Final Report to the Of-
fice of Population Affairs (1976)).
45. See GUTTMACHER, 11 MILLION TEENAGERS, supra note 40, at 44.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 30.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(a), Hist. & Stat. Note 1978.
49. S. REP. No. 95-102, Pub. L. No. 95-83, at 26 (1977), 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 570.
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confidentiality of contraceptive services to teenagers, stating that federal
agencies should recognize the preference of "the teenage target group"
for using Title X-funded clinics as its source of contraceptive information
and services, attributable in part to "the greater degree of teenage confi-
dence in the confidentiality which can be assured by a family planning
clinic. 50
The Congressional Record of debate on the 1978 amendment simi-
larly reflects these intentions. In presenting the bill to the Senate, Senator
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Child and
Human Development, expressed concern over the unmet need of "an es-
timated 2 million sexually active teenagers who do not have ready access
to preventive family planning services."''0 As Senator Cranston ex-
plained, among the major goals of the amendment, was "to place new
emphasis on the provision of family planning services to sexually active
adolescents. 52 In addition, because of the great success of Title X clinics
in reaching teens, Senator Cranston believed "common-sense dictates that
these clinics should form the cornerstone of Federal programs to assist
sexually active adolescents to avoid unwanted pregnancies., 53 With the
adoption of this amendment, the liberal strategy of reducing teenage
pregnancy through increasing teens' access to contraception and informa-
tion was set firmly in place.
2. The 1978 Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy
Prevention and Care Act
In addition to passing an amendment specifying the provision of
family planning services to adolescents within Title X itself, in the same
year Congress agreed to add a separate, additional title to the Public
Health Service Act, focusing entirely on adolescent pregnancies.5 4 This
legislation, entitled the Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Pre-
vention and Care Act (AHSPPCA), was sponsored by Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass.), 55 and further implemented liberal strategies of con-
traceptive access and information through various projects focused on
serving pregnant teens. 56 Among the purposes of the AHSPPCA was "to
expand and improve the availability of, and access to, needed comprehen-
50. Id. See also Cook, supra note 27, at 27-28.
51. 124 CONG. REc. S16,446 (1978). See also Heckler, 712 F.2d at 652 (providing background infor-
mation concerning Congress' desire to satisfy the family planning needs of sexually active teen-
agers).
52. 124 CONG. REc. S16,447 (1978).
53. Id.
54, See Adolescent Health Services Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act, Pub. L. No. 95-626, §
601(a)(7), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 3595.
55. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 72-75.
56. See Cook, supra note 27, at 29-36.
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sive community services which assist in preventing unwanted initial and
repeat pregnancies among adolescents. 57
However, the AHSPPCA was a compromise among legislators, 8
and, as such, indicates the beginning of conservative strategies to reduce
teenage pregnancy by discouraging sexual activity through parental in-
volvement. The projects established by the AHSPPCA limited services
available to nonpregnant adolescents to "counseling and referral" 59-an
attempt to reduce the provision of contraceptives-but with "supplemen-
tal services where such services are not adequate or not available . . .
which are essential to the care of pregnant adolescents and to the preven-
tion of adolescent pregnancy. 6 ° In addition, for the projects to receive
grant money, they were required to ensure that minors seeking services
were "encouraged, whenever feasible, to consult with their parents with
respect to such services' ', 61 This clause was part of the AHSPPCA, not
Title X, and it sought to encourage, not mandate, pregnant teens to in-
volve their parents in services. Notably, however, with this clause, Con-
gress expressly raised the idea of involving parents in family planning
legislation, in direct contrast to Congress' previous recognition in its
1978 expansion of Title X that family planning services required confi-
dentiality to be effective for teens.62
B. Later History of Title X:
Mandating Parental Involvement
1. The 1978 Volkmer Amendment
Also in the same year, a more overt attempt to implement conser-
vative strategies of parental involvement within Title X itself began de-
veloping in Congress. While Congress amended Title X to extend to
adolescents specifically and passed the AHSPPCA, Representative Harold
Volkmer (D-Mo.) unsuccessfully proposed the first parental notification
amendment to Title X.6 3 As proposed, the Volkmer Amendment would
have added a new subsection to Title X, mandating that no organization
or project that directly or indirectly received Title X funds could provide
57. Adolescent Health Services Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act, Pub. L. No. 95-626, §
601(b)(1), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 3595.
58. See Cook, supra note 27, at 29-36.
59. Adolescent Health Services Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act, Pub. L. No. 95-626, §§
602(4)(B), 604(a)(3), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 3596-97.
60. Id.
61. Adolescent Health Services Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act, Pub. L. No. 95-626, §
606(a)(21), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 3600.
62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. See 124 CONG. REC. H37,044 (1978); Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 660 (D.C.Cir.
1983) (describing the House debate over the Volkmer Amendment).
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prescription contraceptive drugs or devices to "an unemancipated child
under the age of 16" without first notifying the parent or guardian "of
such child. 64 In presenting his amendment to Congress, Representative
Volkmer argued from a parents' rights perspective, claiming that "a par-
ent does have a constitutional right to be notified; that a parent, as the
head of a family, is an underlying part of our society and our structure. 65
Moreover, he argued, parents' rights are "firmly established in the tradi-
tions and laws of this Nation," and were "being invaded by ... family
planning. 66 Instead of viewing Title X as protecting and promoting the
rights of adolescents to procreative privacy, Volkmer characterized Title
X as a threat to the authoritative power of parents.
The majority of Congress disagreed. Fearing that mandated parental
notification would not bolster parental guidance and authority but instead
deter adolescents from going to the clinics at all, resulting in more teen-
age pregnancies and soaring welfare costs, 67 Congress rejected the
68
amendment by a wide margin.
2. The 1981 Adolescent Family Life Act
While the Volkmer Amendment ultimately failed, three years later
conservative strategies began to take hold of the legislature when the
House passed a bill that replaced Senator Kennedy's 1978 Adolescent
Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act.6 9 Entitled the
Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), the legislation revised the terms of
Kennedy's teenage pregnancy projects to mandate parental involvement,
involve religious groups, discourage abortion, and encourage adoption and
abstinence. 70 Known to its opponents as the "Chastity Act," the contro-
versial act passed through Congress as part of a compromise that if De-
mocrats supported it, Republicans would support other, more broad family
planning initiatives.7' This compromise and the success of the AFLA in
Congress marked the beginning of the rise of conservative strategies to
reduce teenage pregnancy, fostered by newly elected President Ronald
Reagan.72
The text of the AFLA reveals a major step toward increasing paren-
tal involvement in federal family planning programs by mandating paren-
64. 124 CONG. REC. H37,044 (1978) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. id.
67. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H37, 044 (1978) (statement of Representative Paul D. Rogers (D-
Fla.)).
68. See 124 CONG. REc. H37,044 (1978) (vote of45 to 10).
69. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 78.
70. See I FEDERAL ABORTION POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, CONGRESSIONAL ACTION pt. 1, 149
(Neal Devins with Wendy L. Watson, eds., 1995) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL ACTION].
71. See id.
72. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 77-78.
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tal involvement in a teenage pregnancy project, thus opening the door to
the possibility of establishing similar mandates in other family planning
programs in the future. Like the AHSPPCA it revised, the AFLA was an
experimental program for pregnant teens and did not govern general con-
traceptive services to all teens. 73 Yet, unlike the AHSPPCA, the AFLA
established a mandatory parental notification requirement within a feder-
ally funded family planning program.7 4 In its findings and purposes, the
AFLA states that "since the family is the basic social unit in which the
values and attitudes of adolescents concerning sexuality and pregnancy are
formed, programs designed to deal with issues of sexuality and pregnancy
will be successful to the extent that such programs encourage and sustain
the role of the family. 75 To receive grants under the AFLA, projects
were required to describe how they would "involve families of adolescents
in a manner which will maximize the role of the family in the solution of
problems relating to the parenthood or pregnancy of the adolescent," as
well as involve religious and private sector organizations.76
The AFLA's parental notification requirement was more binding
than the AHSPPCA's strong encouragement to involve parents: project
grantees were required to "notify the parents or guardians of any uneman-
cipated minor requesting services . . . and . . . obtain the permission of
such parents or guardians," unless the minor proved she was the victim of
incest, that notifying her parents would result in physical injury, or that
her parents were "attempting to compel [her] to have an abortion. 7 7
Ironically, conservatives claimed that where parents were not physically
or sexually abusive, their input was essential to all family planning serv-
ices for teens, except when a particular teen's parents encouraged abor-
tion, in which case parental input was not required because it was seen as a
threat to family structure.78
Instead of the parents' rights perspective of the Volkmer Amend-
ment, the sponsors of the AFLA argued more subtly that religion and pa-
rental involvement would reduce teenage pregnancy, and that the family
unit was undermined when adolescents were allowed to make family plan-
ning decisions by themselves. The House Report on the AFLA contended
that the freedom given to "sexually precocious young people" under the
AHSPPCA may have increased rates of abortion and teenage pregnancy,
73. See Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2002(a)(2)(A)-(B), (a)(7)-(8), 95 Stat.
580-581 (1981), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 70, at 256-58.
74. See id. at §§ 2006(a)(22)(A)-(C), 95 Stat. 587-88 (1981), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION,
supra note 70, at 263-264.
75. Id. at § 2001(a)(10)(A), 95 Stat. 579 (1981), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 70,
at 255.
76. See id at §§ 2006(a)(21)(A)-(B), 95 Stat. 587 (1981), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra
note 70, at 263.
77. See id. at §§ 2006(a)(22)(A)-(C), 95 Stat. 587-88 (1981), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION,
supra note 70, at 263-264.
78. See id.
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while "strik[ing] at the family, the basic unit in society."79 Because the
reporting committee believed that many societal forces "come between
the parent and child on issues involving morality, values and interpersonal
relationship,"' it recommended the AFLA revisions to the AHSPPCA to
ensure formal involvement of parents in services provided to teens.8s
While Congress did not go as far as claiming that parents' rights were
trammeled by the procreative privacy of adolescents, it laid the ground-
work for such an argument by "recogniz[ing] the natural and legitimate
interest that parents have in providing their children with education and
care in the area of human sexuality.
8 2
3. The 1981 Family Participation Amendment and the HHS
"Squeal Rule"
In the same year that Congress replaced the AHSPPCA with the
AFLA, it also infused the language of Title X itself with the notion of
parental involvement. Congress passed an amendment to Title X that
added the requirement that, "[t]o the extent practical," recipients of
grants "shall encourage family participation" in family planning serv-
ices.8 3 While, again, this amendment did not mandate parental involve-
ment for minors receiving services under Title X, with this amendment
Congress expanded the notion of parental involvement in family plan-
ning decisions beyond the experimental projects of the AFLA and
AHSPPCA, to Title X itself. This intention is reflected in the Senate Re-
port that accompanied the amendment, which stated that "while family
involvement is not mandated, it is important that families participate in
the activities authorized by this title as much as possible. 8 4 The Report
also stated that it was "the intent of the Conferees" that Title X recipi-
ents encourage clients "to include their families in counseling and involve
them in decisions. 85
After Congress amended Title X to "encourage family participa-
tion,, 8 6 the Reagan administration's Department of Health and Human
79. S. REP. No. 97-161, at 7 (198 1), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 70, at 275.
80. Id at 8, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 70, at 276.
81. See id. at 9, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 70, at 277.
82. Id. The AFLA was challenged by civil rights and women's groups as an impermissible govern-
ment establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The Su-
preme Court, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), upheld the facial constitutionality of the
law by a 5 to 4 vote, but remanded for the question of constitutionality as applied. The parties ul-
timately settled before this issue was decided. See CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 70, at 249-
250.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1998).
84. S. REP. No. 97-208 at 799 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 1161. See also Planned
Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 657 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress' intent was to
encourage, rather than to require, family involvement).
85. S. REP. No. 97-208, at 799 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1l61.
86. Requirements Applicable to Projects for Family Planning Services, 47 Fed. Reg. 7699 (1981) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (proposed Dec. 21, 1981).
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Services (HHS) seized the opportunity to expand conservative strategies
regarding Title X by issuing regulations that interpreted the new amend-
ment to mandate parental notification for minors seeking contracep-
tion.8 7 The HHS regulations, known collectively by opponents as the
"squeal rule,, 88 stated that when a Title X clinic initially provided pre-
scription drugs or devices to an unemancipated minor, it was required to
"notify the minor's parents or guardian that they were provided within
10 working days following their provision . . . [and] verify that the noti-
fication was received." 89 If a clinic was unable to verify that a teen's par-
ents received notification, it was prohibited from providing prescription
contraceptive drugs or devices to that teen.90 Mirroring the language
newly applied to pregnancy projects under the AFLA, the regulations ex-
empted a minor from notification if "the project director determines that
such notification will result in physical harm to the minor by the parents
or guardian," or where the clinic provided prescription drugs to treat a
sexually transmitted disease. 91 In addition, every Title X clinic was re-
quired to keep records on the parental notifications, verifications, and
any exemptions to the rule it made and why, which the Secretary could
request to review at any time. 92 The regulations also provided that, in ad-
dition to federal guidelines, if a state law required parental notification or
consent, Title X clinics must comply with all such laws.
93
In justifying these interpretive regulations, HHS was more explicit in
its belief in the rationale of parents' rights, previously articulated by Rep-
resentative Volkmer, than Congress had been in explaining the parental
notification requirement it included in the AFLA. As the introduction to
the HHS regulations explained, "[p]articularly where prescription drugs or
... devices are being considered, parents have a direct and legitimate con-
cern in participating in a decision that may have long-term health conse-
quences for the adolescent., 94 Further, in promulgating regulations that
required parents to be notified after, instead of before, a minor receives
87. See id. at 7699-7701; LUKER, supra note 25, at 77-79.
88. See LUKER, supra note 25, at 78.
89. Requirements Applicable to Projects for Family Planning Services, 47 Fed. Reg. 7699, 7701
(1982) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (proposed Dec. 21, 1981).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. The HHS regulations also included a provision that this article will not address, which re-
defined the income eligibility for receiving Title X services so that a minor's income was deter-
mined from both her and her parents' resources, where it had previously been calculated from
her resources alone. Thus while the majority of minors had been eligible for federally funded
services under Title X, this amendment disqualified any minor whose parents earned more than
the maximum income eligible for Title X-funded services. The Secretary of HHS justified this
provision because the previous eligibility calculation "indirectly discourage[d] family involve-
ment in the receipt of services by certain minors," and was, therefore, "inconsistent" with the
new amendment encouraging family participation. See id. at 7700.
94. Id at 7699-7700.
BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
contraception, HHS reasoned that it "establishes a reasonable balance be-
tween competing concerns" of adolescents and their parents. 95 Yet in re-
ality, this "reasonable" balance still privileged parental interests over
adolescent privacy rights by ignoring the chilling effect of a parental no-
tification requirement on adolescents, who would likely be deterred from
seeking contraception if their parents would be involved at any time. Fi-
nally, in regards to the provision that Title X clinics must comply with
state laws of parental notification, HHS explained that so reconciling
state and federal law was appropriate because "[t]raditionally, this has
been an area which States, in their role as parens patriae, have regu-
lated. 96
C. Early Federal Court Decisions:
The Preeminence of Congressional Intent
The federal courts' first pronouncement regarding a parental notifi-
cation requirement for minors to obtain contraception came in response
to the HHS regulations. In Planned Parenthood v. Schweiker,97 the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that Title X recipients and
minors seeking contraception would suffer irreparable injury as a result of
the regulations.98 Finding that the statutory language of the 1981
amendment provided "no grant of authority by Congress that reasonably
contemplates the [HHS] regulations," 99 the court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of the regulations
that were "invalid as clearly in excess of statutory authority."'
' °
On appeal, in Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 10 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed, holding that its own careful analysis
of Title X and the Act's legislative history "make[] it clear that these
regulations not only violate Congress' specific intent as to the issue of
parental notification, but also undermine the fundamental purposes of the
Title X program."' 0 2 First, the court addressed the notification and verifi-
cation requirements imposed upon Title X grantees who provided contra-
ception to unemancipated minors. 103 The court focused on the issue of
congressional intent to impose such a federal regulation, highlighting the
"permissive and non-obligatory" nature of the language in the 1981 fam-
95. Id. at 7700.
96. Id.
97. 559 F. Supp. 658 (1983).
98. See id. at 666.
99. Id. at 667.
100. Id. at 670.
101. 712 F.2d 650 (D.C.Cir. 1983). The name of the case changed because, in 1980, Margaret Heck-
ler replaced Richard Schweiker as the Secretary of HHS.
102. Id. at 656.
103. See id. at 654-61.
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ily participation amendment. 10 4 The court also looked to the Committee
Report for the legislative history of the amendment, which stated clearly
that "family involvement is not mandated," but only encouraged as much
as possible. 10 5 The court found this to be a "crystal-clear and unequivocal
expression of congressional intent" that "Congress most definitely did
not intend to mandate family involvement."' 6 The court also cited the
House rejection of the 1978 Volkmer Amendment, 0 7 and held that the
proposed construction of the 1981 amendment by HHS undermined the
original congressional purpose behind Title X.' °8
Next, the court considered the HHS regulation that Title X grantees
must comply with any state parental notification or consent requirements
for minors seeking contraception. 0 9 The Court found this to be "an in-
valid delegation of authority to the states" because, "[i]n the absence of
Congress' express authorization to HHS to in turn empower the states to
set eligibility criteria," the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution for-
bids allowing states to add their own conflicting requirements to federal
programs." ° The court affirmed the District Court's injunction, and
struck down the regulations as exceeding the bounds of statutory authority
and contravening congressional intent."' l Shortly thereafter, in New York
v. Heckler,112 the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion, perma-
nently enjoining the 1981 HHS parental notification regulation as invalid
for similarly situated plaintiffs in New York state."
13
For several years after striking down the HHS regulations, federal
courts invalidated state laws requiring parental notification for minors to
obtain contraception from Title X-funded clinics based on the logic of
Planned Parenthood v. Heckler: a parental notification law contravened
the congressional intent behind Title X, and the Supremacy Clause dic-
tated that states could not impose their own requirements on federal pro-
grams. 114 In 1983, in Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v.
Matheson,115 the District Court for the Central Division of Utah held
that a Utah parental notification law "would do major damage to the fed-
104. See id. at 656.
105. See id. at 657 (quoting Conference Committee Report).
106. Id. at 657.
107. See id at 660.
108. See id. at 661.
109. See id. at 663-64.
110. See id. at 663.
111. See id. at 665.
112. 719 F.2d 1191 (2d. Cir. 1983) (affirming New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354 (1983)).
113. See id. Note, however, that the Second Circuit did not enjoin the HHS regulation that enforced
compliance with state parental consent laws. As neither New York nor neighboring states had a
parental notification requirement, the court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge
this provision. See id. at 1196.
114. See Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d at 657, 661, 663-64.
115. 582 F. Supp. 1001 (1983).
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eral interests created by Title X by preventing Title X grantees from pro-
viding confidential services to eligible minors on request."' 16 Moreover,
the court held that when there is a conflict between federal legislative in-
tent behind a federal program and state legislative desires, "the Supremacy
Clause dictates that the federal law prevail."' 1 7 Likewise, in 1985, in Does
v. Utah State Department of Health,' 8 the Tenth Circuit upheld an in-
junction against a state health department, preventing it from enforcing a
parental consent requirement passed in the state as an impermissible addi-
tional requirement on federal Title X funds.
In each of these cases, the court based its decision on its under-
standing of the congressional intent behind Title X. In Planned Parent-
hood v. Heckler and New York v. Heckler, the major issue was whether
Congress intended to mandate parental involvement and whether it dele-
gated such power to the Secretary of HHS." 9 In Planned Parenthood As-
sociation of Utah v. Matheson and Does v. Utah, the federal courts began
to address the larger constitutional issues raised by any parental notifica-
tion requirement for minors to obtain contraception. 120 Yet because the
state requirements involved in these two cases posed additional state
regulations on a federally funded program, the decisive factor remained
the congressional intent behind Title X.12' Based primarily on the belief
that Congress did not intend to impose a parental notification require-
ment on minors' access to contraceptive services funded by Title X, the
courts struck down the HHS regulations and the Utah state law, leaving
the larger question of the constitutionality of such a burden on the mi-
nors' reproductive privacy rights unresolved.
122
II. PRESENT EFFORTS: THE PARENTAL
NOTIFICATION ACT OF 1998
A. The Growing Support for and Provisions of the Act
The movement to legislate a parental notification requirement for
Title X clinics that provide contraception to minors was revived in 1996,
when sponsors of the 1998 Parental Notification Act proposed a similar
116. Id. at 1006. The court also discussed constitutional challenges to a parental notification require-
ment that are discussed infra Part II.B.2.
117. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1006.
118. 776 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1985).
119. See supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text
120. See infra Part II.B.2.
121. See Does v. Utah, 776 F.2d at 254; Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp.
at 1006.
122. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1009.
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provision. 123 In 1996, the proposed amendment did not pass through its
committee.' 24 In 1997, sponsors again proposed a parental notification
amendment to Title X. 125 This time, the amendment passed through its
congressional committee, but was defeated in the House of Representa-
tives. 26 In February of 1998, the provisions of the Act were raised in two
separate bills, and then ultimately combined into the Parental Notifica-
tion Act in October of 1998.27 After overcoming a challenge from a
compromise bill that would have required abstinence counseling and more
rigorous reporting of sexual abuse and statutory rape, but would not have
mandated parental notification, 28 the Parental Notification Act of 1998
succeeded in passing through the House of Representatives.
t29
After this 1998 victory, fearing a presidential veto, its sponsors set
the Act aside.' 30 Still, they "expect[ed] the bill to surface again [the] next
year in some form, with more support.' 13 1 Noting that the bill "gets
more support each time it comes up," the spokesman for one of the bill's
sponsors stated in a press release that, in 1999, sponsors would "start
from the perspective that we had a House vote and it passed."' 132 In 1999,
another attempt to pass a parental notification requirement for contra-
ception was dropped in exchange for a fifty million dollar increase in ab-
stinence education funding, yet supporters of such a requirement show no
signs of abandoning their efforts in the future.
13 3
Because a future parental notification requirement for publicly
funded contraception would likely contain provisions similar to those of
the Parental Notification Act of 1998, it is useful to analyze the constitu-
tionality of the provisions of the 1998 Act. As it was originally drafted,
the Act contains four major provisions 134 that borrow language from suc-
cessful efforts to mandate parental notification for abortion, and from
welfare reform laws.' 35 First, the Act holds that no entity receiving Title
123. See Stanek, supra note 6.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Politics & Policy Title X. Controversial Contraceptive Provision Passes, AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK, AMERiCAN HEALTH LINE, Oct. 9, 1998, at 5.
129. See Stanek, supra note 6.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing spokesman for Representative Donald Manzullo (R-Ill.)).
133. See supra notes 7-11, 21 and accompanying text. Whether a parental notification requirement
like the 1998 Act passes and becomes law is a political question that depends upon future elec-
tions (i.e., which party wins a congressional majority and the presidency in the year 2000). Nev-
ertheless, this article reveals a trend toward increasing parental involvement in minors'
reproductive decisions, which will likely result in a parental notification requirement for feder-
ally funded contraception at some point in the near future.
134. See H.R. 4721, 105th Cong. (1998) (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?cI05:H.R.4721:>.
135. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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X funds "shall be exempt from any State law" that requires "notification
or . . . reporting of child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape or
incest."' 136 Second, the Act holds that no Title X funds will be provided to
any family planning project if any of its providers "knowingly provides
contraceptive drugs or devices to a minor," unless the provider gives "ac-
tual written notice" to a parent or guardian of the minor five business
days prior to providing contraception, unless the minor is emancipated
under state law, provides written consent of a parent or guardian, or a
court has determined that the minor may receive contraception.137 Third,
the Act requires that Title X-funded family planning projects "expressly
inform" all minors seeking their services "that abstinence is the only cer-
tain way" to avoid pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and WHV.1 38
The Act also mandates training clinic counselors to encourage minors to
abstain from and "avoid being coerced into" sexual activity and to in-
volve their parents in contraceptive decisions. 139 Finally, the Act
authorizes the Secretary of HHS to develop and distribute training proto-
cols for counselors, including those specific to younger teens and empow-
ers the Secretary to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to
effectuate" the Act.
1 40
B. Probable Court Analysis of the Act
1. Congressional Intent
If a parental notification requirement like the 1998 Act were to pass
through Congress and become law, the reasoning upon which courts had
based their rejection of past parental notification requirements for con-
traception would no longer exist. The courts would be faced with a signifi-
cant change to the original congressional intent behind Title X, and it was
this intent to expand access to family planning that served as the basis for
the courts' decisions to strike down the HHS interpretation of the 1981
family participation amendment in Planned Parenthood v. Heckler and
New York v. Heckler. In its 1983 ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Heckler,
the D.C. Circuit Court stated that "[i]n the absence of a clearly expressed
intent to the contrary, [it would] not construe the 1981 amendment in a
manner which would undermine Congress' broad purposes for enacting
Title X in the first place.' 41 These broad purposes included reducing
136. H.R. 4721, 105th Cong. (1998) (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c105:H.R.4721:>.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 661 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
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teenage pregnancy, which the court found Congress intended to achieve
by providing teens access to information and contraception in a confiden-
tial manner. 142 Yet with a successful amendment to Title X, clearly ex-
pressing Congress' desire to mandate, rather than merely encourage,
parental involvement for minors seeking contraception, the courts could
no longer reason that such a rule contravened congressional intent.
Indeed, the passage of a mandatory parental notification require-
ment similar to the 1998 Act would constitute a clear amendment to the
congressional intent behind Title X, thereby superseding any claim that
the law should be invalidated due to a conflict with congressional intent.
As the Supreme Court has held, "[i]t is a well-established principle of
statutory construction that ...a statute should be interpreted according
to its plain language.' 1 43 While "[t]he meaning to be ascribed to an Act
of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing of every rele-
vant aid to construction,"'4 4 the Court has held that a "change of [statu-
tory] language is some evidence of a change of purpose."'145 Since shortly
after the creation of Title X in 1970, Congress has actively discussed
whether to mandate parental involvement in minors' ability to obtain
contraception under Title X. 146 After rejecting the 1978 Volkmer
Amendment, adding the 1981 family participation amendment, and wit-
nessing the courts' rejection of the HHS "squeal rule," the passage of a
parental notification amendment to Title X would necessarily represent a
clear change in Congress' thinking on this issue.147 Thus, were a bill simi-
lar to the Parental Notification Act of 1998 to succeed in passing through
the Senate and obtain approval from the President, courts would be com-
pelled to find that such an act indicates a new congressional intent behind
Title X.
2. Constitutional Challenges
While a challenge to a parental notification requirement like the
1998 Act may be unsuccessful on grounds of contravening congressional
intent, such a requirement could be challenged on constitutional grounds
for imposing an undue burden on a minor's right to privacy in procreative
decisions. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue as it relates to a
minor's right to obtain contraception, yet it has handed down a number
of decisions in the analogous context of a minor's right to obtain an abor-
142. See id. at 660.
143. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980).
144. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1940) (citations and footnotes omitted). See
also McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 650 n. 14 (1982).
145. Johnson v. United States, 225 U.S. 405, 415 (1912). See also McElroy, 455 U.S. at 650 n.14.
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. See supra Part I.B.
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tion .148 From these decisions, the Court has established parameters within
which Congress could likely create a constitutionally permissible parental
notification requirement for contraception. A close reading of the text of
the Parental Notification Act of 1998 indicates just this: the sponsors of
the Act have carefully crafted a parental notification requirement for
contraception that falls within constitutionally appropriate parameters in
the analogous context of abortion. Thus, because of the way the Act is
written, requiring parental notification rather than consent, an exemption
for emancipated minors, and a judicial bypass option for minors to obtain
contraception without notifying their parents, a similarly constructed pa-
rental notification requirement for contraception would likely withstand
constitutional challenge.
The Supreme Court has not, itself, addressed a minor's right to pri-
vacy in the context of contraception, yet one federal court did address
this question-the District Court for the Central Division of Utah in
Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. Matheson.149 Here, based on
the Supremacy Clause, the court struck down a Utah state law requiring
parental notification for minors to obtain contraception under Title X, as
an impermissible state-imposed requirement on a federal program. 50
While ultimately decided on the basis of federal congressional intent,
Matheson presents the only consideration by a federal court of the larger
constitutional questions raised by a parental notification requirement for
contraception. The Utah state law in question imposed a blanket require-
ment on Title X organizations, mandating parental notification for all
minors seeking contraceptives without exception,' 5 1 which Planned Par-
enthood challenged as "unconstitutionally overbroad. ' " 2 After analyzing
and analogizing prior Supreme Court cases on abortion, the court held
148. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (declaring judicial bypass provision allow-
ing waiver of notice requirement, if notice not in minor's best interest, was sufficient to protect
minor's right to abortion); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(upholding Pennsylvania's parental consent provision as it did not impose an undue burden and
was therefore valid); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (finding that Minnesota's re-
quirement that both parents be notified of minor's abortion decision was unconstitutional, but that
provision requiring parental notification unless minor obtains judicial bypass was constitutional);
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) [hereinafter Akron II]
(holding in part that judicial bypass procedure complied with Fourteenth Amendment and that
state could require physician to give parental notice before performing abortion); H.L. v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding Utah law providing that, where possible, physician should
notify parents of minor seeking an abortion before exercising her medical judgment of whether
to perform the abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti Il] (holding
that Massachusetts' requirement that minor seeking an abortion obtain parental consent or judi-
cial approval following notification to her parents unconstitutionally burdened the minor's right to
seek an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding in
part that a state's blanket parental consent requirement for minors was unconstitutional).
149. 582 F. Supp. 1001 (Cent. D. Utah 1983).
150. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
151. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1002, n.l (citing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-325 (1983)).
152. Id. at 1007.
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that "the state may not impose a blanket parental notification require-
ment on minors seeking to exercise their constitutionally protected right
to decide whether to bear or to beget a child by using contraceptives.'
Thus, the court concluded that because the Utah law "fail[ed] to provide a
procedure whereby a mature minor or a minor who can demonstrate that
his or her best interests are contrary to parental notification can obtain
contraceptives confidentially," the no-exception parental notification
rule was likely unconstitutional.'
4
While the Supreme Court has not addressed a parental notification
requirement for contraception, it began to address issues of reproductive
privacy and minors' access to abortion thirty-five years ago. The Su-
preme Court first identified a right to privacy that included contraceptive
decisions in the 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut.15 5 In Griswold, the
Court held that there was a "zone of privacy created by several funda-
mental constitutional guarantees" that made it unconstitutional for the
state to prohibit a married couple from using contraception or a doctor
from assisting in such use. 156 Then, in 1972, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,5 7 the
Court extended this right of privacy to single people as well, based on the
equal protection notion that a married couple was made up of two sepa-
rate individuals, each bearing a right to privacy) 58
As the court explained in Planned Parenthood Association of Utah
v. Matheson, a review of the relevant Supreme Court cases prior to 1983
shows a substantial, but not unlimited, right to reproductive privacy for
minors.1 59 In 1976, the Court first addressed the application of the right
to privacy to minors, in a challenge to a parental consent requirement for
abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.160 In
Danforth, the Supreme Court held that a similar right of privacy extends
to minors, however "the [s]tate has somewhat broader authority to regu-
late the activities of children than of adults.', 6 1 The Court held that there
must be a "significant state interest . . . not present in the case of an
adult" to justify state burdens on the privacy right of minors.1 62 The
Court struck down the Missouri law absolutely requiring one parent's con-
sent for an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen to obtain an abor-
153. Id. at 1009.
154. See id.
155. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. See id. at 485; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1007.
157. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
158. See id at 453-54; Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1007.
159. See Planned Parenthood v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1007-08. For other analyses of relevant Su-
preme Court decisions prior to 1984, see also Olah, supra note 23, at 508-522; Himmelfarb, supra
note 27, at 728-32; Hofman, supra note 12, at 1337-41, 1348-50.
160. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
161. Id. at 74; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1007-1008.
162. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F.
Supp. at 1008.
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tion (unless her life was at stake) because the provision gave "a third
party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient" which was unconstitutional.163 The Court re-
quired a mature minor to have an alternative to parental consent in order
to obtain an abortion.
164
The Supreme Court next addressed minors' access to contraception
in general in the 1977 case Carey v. Population Services International,
16 1
in which plaintiffs challenged a New York state law prohibiting the sale of
over-the-counter contraceptives to anyone under 16 years of age. 66 The
Court held that because the Constitution protects an individual's right to
make childbearing decisions, strict scrutiny applies to laws restricting
adults' access to contraception. 67 Because the state has greater power to
regulate the conduct of minors, however, the Court held that the less
stringent standard of "significant state interest" articulated in Danforth
168applies. Yet then, relying on Danforth, the Court held that "[s]ince the
[s]tate may not impose ... a blanket requirement of parental consent ...
on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutional-
ity of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to mi-
nors is afortiori foreclosed.' 69 Moreover, the Court did not believe that
the state had proved its proffered justification for imposing such a burden
upon a minor's right to contraception-that limiting access to contracep-
tion would reduce teenage sexual activity.' 70
Yet while the Supreme Court held that an absolute, blanket provision
against minors' independent access to abortion or contraception was un-
constitutional, the Court also held that a minor did not have an absolute,
unqualified right to make her own decisions regarding family planning.' 7 1
After Carey, the Court began to chip away at minors' rights to reproduc-
tive privacy by upholding properly designed parental consent require-
ments that allowed "mature" minors a judicial alternative to obtain an
abortion without notifying their parents. In 1979, in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti 11),172 the Court again struck down a blanket parental consent
requirement for minors seeking abortions, yet discussed at length the pa-
rameters within which a properly crafted parental consent requirement
would be constitutional. 73 The Court explained that a parental consent
163. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F.
Supp. at 1008.
164. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75; see also, Cook, supra note 27, at 22.
165. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
166. See id. at 681-82.
167. See id. at 688; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1007.
168. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 692-93.
169. Id. at 694.
170. See id. at 694-96.
171. See Olah, supra note 23, at 513.
172. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
173. See id. at 643-44, 647-48.
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requirement would be permissible if the state provided a judicial bypass
option whereby without notifying her parents, a minor could prove she
was either mature enough to make her own decision to have an abortion
or that the abortion was in her best interests. 174 The Court did not strike
down parental notification requirements for abortion per se, but limited
its ruling to striking down this particular law, which required the consent
of both parents or judicial bypass of which the parents were notified. 17 5
The Court found this too burdensome to the minor's privacy rights, func-
tioning as the practical equivalent of the blanket notification rule struck
down in Danforth.176
The Court continued to narrow minors' privacy rights in the 1981
case H.L. v. Matheson,117 in which the Court upheld a Utah law providing
that, where possible, a physician should notify parents of a minor seeking
an abortion before exercising his medical judgment whether to perform
the abortion.' 78 The Court distinguished Bellotti II and Danforth by
claiming that Utah's law did not impose a blanket parental consent re-
quirement as did the two laws previously struck down.' 79 Instead, the
Court held, the Utah law "[a]s applied to immature and dependent mi-
nors," was properly narrow to serve the state interests of "family integ-
rity and protecting adolescents," and was upheld as explicitly limited to
immature minors who lived with their parents.' 80 The Court rearticulated
this holding in Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri
v. Ashcroft,181 by construing its decision in H.L. v. Matheson as "uphold-
ing a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to
mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such noti-
fication detrimental to their best interests."
'1 82
During the 1990s, the Court further broadened its support of what it
deemed to be properly crafted and constitutionally permissible parental
consent requirements for abortion. In Ohio v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health (Akron JI),183 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit's ruling that an Ohio parental consent law was unconstitutional, and
upheld a significantly more burdensome parental consent requirement for
minors seeking abortions. 184 At issue was the constitutional adequacy of
the judicial bypass procedure in the Ohio parental notification law, which
174. See id.; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (1983).
175. See Belotti I1, 443 U.S. at 647-5 i.
176. See Olah, supra note 23, at 515-17.
177. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
178. Seeid. at 413.
179. See id. at 407-12; see also Olah, supra note 23, at 519-20.
180. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411,413; Olah, supra note 23, at 520-21.
181. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
182. Id. at 492 n. 17; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1008,
n.6.
183. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
184. See id. at 506-07.
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was more burdensome than any other bypass option previously considered
by the Court.' 85 To obtain court authorization for an abortion, the minor
was required to file a complaint in juvenile court and obtain a guardian ad
litem and an attorney for the proceeding. 186 She then had to prove ma-
turity, a pattern of parental abuse, or, under the more difficult "clear and
convincing evidence" standard, that an abortion was in her best inter-
est. 187 Relying on the notion that "[w]here fairly possible, courts should
construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality," the Court
upheld the Ohio law regardless of these additional burdens.'8 8 In so doing,
the Court found no constitutional significance in the fact that the Ohio
law included the additional burdens of confidential rather than anonymous
court proceedings,' 8 9 the possibility that the process could take up to
twenty-two days, 190 a heightened standard of proof required of the mi-
nor, 191 pleading forms that required the minor to plead either maturity or
best interest but not both,' 92 and allowing the physician performing the
abortion to notify the minor's parents.193 Moreover, the Court acknowl-
edged the possibility that no judicial bypass proceedings may be required
by the Constitution where a law requires parental notification rather than
parental consent for a minor's abortion. Because the Ohio law included a
judicial bypass option, however, the Court left this question unan-
swered. '
94
The very same day, the Court allowed for additional burdens on a
minor's access to abortion in its fragmented decision in Hodgson v. Min-
185. See id. at 524-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (articulating the extreme constraints the Ohio law,
which the plurality upheld, places upon judicial bypass-constraints which in effect negate the
judicial bypass option's constitutional protection against mandatory parental involvement).
186. See id. at 508.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 514 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
492 (1983).
189. See id. at 512-13. A confidential proceeding requires the teenager seeking a judicial bypass to
provide her name, which will be kept confidential by the court, while an anonymous proceeding
allows the teen to withhold her identity completely. See id at 512. As Justice Blackmun points out
in his dissent, by allowing ajudicial bypass option that is not anonymous, the Court makes a sig-
nificant departure from Bellotti 11 and its prior limits on parental consent requirements. See id. at
530-31. "A minor, whose very purpose in going through a judicial bypass proceeding is to avoid
notifying a hostile or abusive parent, would be most alarmed at signing her name and the name of
her parent on the complaint form.... True anonymity is essential to an effective, meaningful by-
pass." Id. at 531 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. See id at 514.
191. See id. at 516. The Court found this unproblematic because the judicial bypass proceeding is an
exparte hearing, in which no one opposes the minor's testimony in Court. See id. Yet as Justice
Blackmun points out in his dissent, the judge poses questions during the hearing and decides if the
standards have been sufficiently met. See id at 534-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Raising the
standard of proof requires that "[elven if the judge is satisfied that the minor is mature or that an
abortion is in her best interest, the court may not authorize the procedure unless it additionally
finds that the evidence meets a 'clear and convincing' standard of proof." Id. at 536 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 516-17.
193. See id. at 518-19.
194. See id at 510.
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nesota. 9' Written in five separate opinions, in this decision, the Court
indicated that a law requiring the consent of both parents, even if one or
both did not maintain legal custody of the minor, and establishing a forty-
eight hour waiting period after giving parental notice before performing
an abortion on a minor, could be permissible if it included a constitution-
ally adequate judicial bypass option.1 96
In its most recent cases, the Court has continued its permissiveness
toward increasingly stringent parental consent requirements for minors
seeking abortions. In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,'97 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law that requires, except in cases of medical emergency, an
unemancipated minor seeking an abortion to give her own informed con-
sent and obtain the informed consent of one parent or guardian.' 98 The
law provides for a judicial bypass option, through which "a court may
authorize the performance of an abortion upon a determination that the
young woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent and has in
fact given her informed consent, or that an abortion would be in her best
interests."' 199 To obtain "informed consent," however, is a much more
significant burden than simply to obtain consent. A physician must: (1)
"inform" the minor and her parent about the abortion procedure, health
risks, and "probable gestation age of the unborn child"; (2) provide state-
sponsored literature-which the consenting party must certify in writing
that she received-about assistance for childbirth, child support, adoption
agencies, and alternatives to abortion; and (3) wait at least twenty-four
hours after providing this "information" before performing the abor-
tion .2 00
Finally, in 1997, in Lambert v. Wicklund ,2  the Court upheld a
Montana parental notification statute it found to be qualitatively identical
to the statute in Akron 11.202 The Court found the statutes the same, even
though the judicial bypass option in Lambert turned on a determination
that parental notification was not in the minor's best interest, which re-
quired the minor to prove a negative assertion. 203 This standard is argua-
bly more difficult to meet than the previous Akron II standard, which
required the minor to prove that the abortion was in her best interest.20 4
195. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
196. See id. at 497.
197. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
198. See id. at 899.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 881, 920-21.
201. 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
202. See id. at 298-99.
203. See id. at 296-99 (emphasis added).
204. See id
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By the mid-1980s, it was clear that the Supreme Court would pro-
hibit any absolute, blanket parental notification requirement for minors
to obtain contraception or an abortion. 205 However, given the Court's
rulings during the 1990s, upholding increasingly more restrictive parental
consent requirements for abortion as long as they included some judicial
bypass option, no matter how burdensome, it is likely that a properly
crafted parental consent requirement for contraception, such as the Pa-
rental Notification Act of 1998, will be upheld.
There is, of course, a difference between abortion and contraception:
as the Supreme Court noted in Carey, "[tlhe State's interests in protec-
tion of the mental and physical health of the pregnant minor . . . are
clearly more implicated by the abortion decision than by the decision to
use a nonhazardous contraceptive., 20 6 However, given the legislative
move toward more conservative strategies for reducing teenage preg-
nancy, the Court could find that a state's interest in protecting the struc-
ture of the family and the authority of parents in order to reduce teenage
pregnancy is a "significant state interest not present in the case of adults"
that meets the Danforth standard and justifies limiting a minor's right to
reproductive privacy. 2° Thus, the concerns of the Court could be as-
suaged with a parental requirement bill crafted like the 1998 Act, which
provides both that an emancipated minor under state law is exempt from
notification requirements, and that a minor may avoid parental notifica-
tion if "a court of competent jurisdiction has directed that the minor may
receive the drugs or devices.
20 8
3. Additional State Law Options for Requiring Parental
Consent
Finally, regardless of whether Congress passes an explicit parental
notification requirement like the 1998 Act, if Congress passes any law
that indicates that its intention of confidentiality for teens under Title X
has changed, the Court has left the door open to properly constructed
state laws that mandate parental notification. As Planned Parenthood
Association of Utah v. Matheson, Does v. Utah, and Planned Parenthood
v. Heckler all indicate, a state is only prohibited from enacting a parental
notification law where such a law directly contradicts the language of Ti-
tle X and its amendments. 20 9 Thus even if Congress itself does not man-
205. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977); see also Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (1983); Olah, supra note 23, at 498-99, 508,
519.
206. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
207. See supra Part I.B.2; infra Part III.A.
208. H.R. 4721, 105th Cong. (1998) (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?cI05:H.R.4721:>.
209. See supra Part II.B.2.
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date parental notification, if the Court believes that the congressional
intent behind Title X has sufficiently changed to favor such a mandate, a
state may be able to pass a law requiring parental notification for contra-
ception funded by Title X so long as it includes some judicial bypass op-
tion.
Alternatively, a state may opt out of Title X funding altogether and
enforce any parental notification requirement it wishes, provided it com-
ports with its own legislation and state Constitution. In Does v. Utah, the
Tenth Circuit struck down the Utah State Health Department's attempt
to enforce a state parental notification law while administering Title X
funds, holding that "Utah is free to apply parental consent requirements
in the use of its own funds," just not in the use of Title X funds.210 Should
this state strategy of foregoing Title X funds result in decreased availabil-
ity or subsidization of publicly funded contraception, for example clinics
raising the cost of services or closing their doors, low-income teens who
rely more heavily on public clinics as their source for obtaining family
planning services will suffer the greatest negative effects. 1
As recently as 1997, the disturbing possibility of this alternate state
strategy surfaced in the federal courts. In County of St. Charles, Missouri
v. Missouri Family Health Council,212 the Eighth Circuit held that a
county with a blanket parental consent requirement for some forms of
contraception was properly denied Title X funds by its state health de-
partment. Relying on the appellate cases of the early 1980s, the court
said that circuits "which have considered the issue have uniformly found
that parental consent cannot be required before a minor receives Title X
services," and that blanket notification requirements are "prohibited by
[federal] statute, regardless of whether they are based on state law. 213
Yet in so finding, the court merely upheld the dismissal of the County's
request to compel the state council that administers Title X to provide
the County with funds; 2 14 the court did not strike down the County's pa-
rental notification requirement as itself invalid. Thus the County appears
to have the option of foregoing its Title X funds and maintaining its pa-
rental consent law, a frightening option that not only infringes upon a
minor's reproductive privacy rights by mandating absolute parental con-
sent, but simultaneously burdens these rights by simply not providing ac-
cess to contraception at all.
210. See Does v. State of Utah Dep't of Health, 776 F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1985).
211. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
212. 107 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1997).
213. Id. at 684-85.
214. See id. at 685.
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M. THE DIMINISHING REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY
RIGHTS OF MINORS
A. The Legislative and Judicial View
of Minors' Privacy Rights
As Congress changed its strategy for reducing teenage pregnancy, its
vision of minors' reproductive privacy rights changed significantly as
well. Faced with what it viewed as a teenage pregnancy epidemic in the
mid-1970s, when Congress saw that Title X clinics were reaching millions
of teenage girls, it recognized that adolescents acted independently with
regard to their sexual activity. Thus Congress valued confidentiality as an
important factor in reaching teens.21 5 Yet by 1981, this legislative strat-
egy had changed to favor parental involvement and abstinence over con-
fidential access to information and contraception as a means for reducing
teenage pregnancy. Confidentiality and the independent rights of teens
gave way to the interests of the state and the notion of parents' rights.21 6
The 1998 passage of the Parental Notification Act through the
House of Representatives signals the completion of this legislative
change: the majority of the House has adopted the formerly conservative
belief that parents have the right to control the sexual behavior of their
teenagers. In February of 1998, while presenting earlier versions of the
1998 Act to the House, sponsor Representative Donald Manzullo (R-Ill.)
argued primarily from a parents' rights perspective. This strategy was
reminiscent of Representative Volkmer's argument during his unsuccessful
attempt to pass a parental notification amendment to Title X in 1978.217
Representative Manzullo decried the "intrusive, overbearing federal gov-
ernment" policies, and lamented that Congress "make[s] laws saying par-
ents are legally responsible for their children's actions until the children
become adults[, b]ut then . . . rip[s] parents from the equation when it
comes to something as critical and potentially dangerous as sexuality."
218
Later that year, in October of 1998, while presenting the current Act to
the House, Manzullo explained that "[w]hat we are simply saying here is
this: Allow the parents in this Nation to be put in charge of the sexuality
of their children."
219
Moreover, even those who opposed the Act and argued for an alter-
nate version that did not mandate parental notification argued not from
the position of protecting adolescent privacy rights, but from the posi-
215. See supra Part I.A. 1.
216. See supra Part I.B.1.
217. See supra Part l.B.
218. 144 CoNG. REc. E179 (Feb. 12, 1998).
219. 144 CONG. REc. H10,144 (Oct. 8, 1998).
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tion of the practical consequences of privileging parents' rights.22 Where
confidentiality and autonomy for teenagers were valued as effective
means of reducing teenage pregnancy in the early days of Title X, by
1998 such values were reduced to little more than their practical conse-
quences. Notably, the sponsors of the alternate amendment, Representa-
tives James Greenwood (R-Pa.) and Michael Castle (R-Del.), distanced
themselves from the notion of a minor's right to reproductive privacy.
Representative Castle stated, "I love the idea of mandatory parental noti-
fication . . . but if we do that, we are not going to have these kids go in
and get the help they need.",221 Representative Greenwood remarked that
his amendment "makes it clear that every . . . counselor has to encourage
family involvement . . . [and] have state of the art training to encourage,
to learn how, and [to] teach kids to involve their parents with these deci-
,,222
sions.' 2 However, this compromise bill valuing parents' rights without
mandating them was not strong enough for the majority of the House; the
Manzullo/Istook Amendment defeated the Greenwood/Castle Amendment
by 224 votes to 200.223
Court decisions from the mid-1970s to the present have reflected a
similar change in the judicial vision of minors' privacy rights, beginning
with the characterization of minors' reproductive privacy rights as
slightly more limited than those of adults, and increasingly diminishing
the scope of these rights. In 1976, in Danforth, the Supreme Court estab-
lished an intermediate scrutiny standard for burdening a minor's right to
reproductive privacy, requiring a "substantial state interest," distinguished
from the state's interest in an adult's reproductive decision.224 By 1979,
in Bellotti II, the Court held that "the guiding role of parents in the up-
bringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of mi-
nors," 225 and that "the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent
with our tradition of individual liberty. 226
By 1990, the Court further diminished the scope of minors' privacy
rights, most notably by upholding its most restrictive parental notifica-
tion requirement for a minor to obtain an abortion in Akron I. After
finding that "[i]t is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that,
in most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified
minor advice that is both compassionate and mature," the Court held that
220. One exception to this complete abandonment of the language of adolescent privacy rights was a
statement made by Representative Johnson, arguing in favor of the Greenwood/Castle alterna-
tive, who stated: "Furthermore, [not mandating parental notification] gives [adolescent girls] a
chance to develop their personal power as a young woman [sic]." 144 CONG. Rac. H 10,145 (Oct.
8, 1998).
221. 144 CONG. REC. H10,144 (Oct. 8, 1998).
222. Id. at H10,143.
223. See id at H10,147.
224. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
225. Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979).
226. Id. at 638-39.
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Ohio's parental notification statute "is a rational way to further those
ends." 227 In so doing, the Court completely ignored the "substantial state
interest" test of Danforth and replaced it with a simple rational relation
test for imposing permissible burdens on a minor's right to privacy in re-
productive decisions. The Court reasoned that "[i]t would deny all dignity
to the family to say that the State cannot take this reasonable step in
regulating its health professions to ensure that, in most cases, young
women will receive guidance and understanding from a parent., 22' Thus,
by 1990 the Court envisioned a minor's right to privacy as less compel-
ling than a rationally related interest of her parents or the state.
B. The Criminalization of Consensual
Sexual Activity Among Minors
While legislative and judicial trends in the laws of contraception and
abortion moved toward diminishing minors' privacy rights, a separate and
parallel legal movement similarly diminished adolescent sexual autonomy
in the name of reducing teenage pregnancy. Starting in the mid-1980s,
state and federal governments began to criminalize consensual adolescent
sexual activity through increasing prosecution of minors under the laws of
sexual abuse and statutory rape.
229
Like conservative strategies for reducing teenage pregnancy through
encouraging parental involvement and abstinence education under Title
X, these laws aimed to reduce teenage pregnancy by discouraging sexual
activity among minors, here through criminal sanctions. The historical
and legal analysis of sexual abuse and statutory rape laws in the context of
teenage pregnancy is a vast topic beyond the scope of this article, 230 but
brief examples of parallels in this area are useful to illustrate the general
legislative and judicial trend toward reducing the sexual autonomy and pri-
vacy rights of minors as a purported means to reduce teenage pregnancy.
1. Child Abuse Reporting Model
One means for criminalizing consensual sexual activity among mi-
nors is to treat such activity as child sexual abuse, regardless of the age of
the so-called "abuser" or the voluntariness of the behavior. One example
of this strategy was the 1986 attempt by the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia to interpret the California law requiring health professionals to re-
port suspected instances of child abuse to include suspected instances of
227. Akron II, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (emphasis added).
228. Id at 520.
229. See infra Part III.B. I and Part 11I.B.2.
230. See, e.g., Patricia Donovan, Special Report, Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective in Preventing
Adolescent Pregnancy?, 29 FAm. PLA.. PERsP. 30 (1997); Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent:
Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 287 (1997).
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any sexual activity of minors under age fourteen as sexual abuse. This At-
torney General policy was challenged in Planned Parenthood Affiliates of
California v. Van de Kamp.23' Like the HHS interpretive regulation of
the 1981 "family participation" amendment to Title X that established
the "squeal rule," this case challenged the Attorney General's interpretive
opinion on the intent of the California legislature.232 The opinion applied
the California Child Abuse Reporting law "to all sexual activity of minors
under 14, without regard to whether the minor is the victim of child abuse
or is engaging in voluntary sexual conduct., 233 The Attorney General
filed his opinion in response to a Los Angeles District Attorney inquiry
about whether the law required filing a report "when a child receives
medical attention for a sexually transmitted disease, for birth control, for
pregnancy, or for abortion." 234 Such an interpretation would require any
health professional who provided contraception to or treated the sexually
transmitted disease of a teenager under fourteen years old to report that
teenager as the victim of sexual abuse, leading to the punishment of her
partner as a sexual abuser regardless of the circumstances of their sexual
activity.
The California Supreme Court struck this interpretation down as an
impermissible sanction on the voluntary sexual activity of adolescents.235
The court found that "if such minors are unable to obtain reproductive
health care on a confidential basis, without their sexual conduct being re-
ported to law enforcement for investigation, they will be deterred from
seeking such care. 236 The court then held that "by requiring blanket re-
porting of voluntary sexual activity solely on the basis of age, the Attor-
ney General has taken a position inconsistent with the [State]
Legislature's judgment that minors under 14 are entitled to confidential
reproductive health care." 237 Much like the "squeal rule," which was
struck down for violating the federal congressional intent behind Title X,
the Attorney General's interpretive opinion was struck down as contra-
vening state legislative intent behind the Child Abuse Reporting Law.
As this case was in California state court rather than federal court,
however, the constitutional issues raised were slightly different. In its rul-
ing in Van de Kamp, the California Supreme Court explained that "[t]he
California [State Constitution's] right of sexual privacy [is] broader than
its federal counterpart necessarily., 238 As such, the California Constitu-
tion "imports the same constitutional privileges to the mature minor" as
231. 226 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1986).
232. See id.
233. Id. at 363.
234. Id. at 366 (quoting 67 Op. Cal. Att'y, Gen. 235, 235 (1985)).
235. See id. at 381-382.
236. Id. at 371.
237. Id. at 373-74.
238. Id. at 379.
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the United States Constitution, if not more.239 Applying a standard
analogous to that articulated in Danforth, the Court found that because
"no significant state interest [is] served[,] ...[t]he reporting of volun-
tary nonabusive behavior as mandated by the Attorney General's opinion
... violate[d] the right to sexual privacy guaranteed mature minors by the
California Constitution., 240 Also, while the California Supreme Court
struck down the Attorney General's interpretive opinion as it related to
consensual sexual activity among peers, two years later, in People ex rel.
Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic, Inc.,241 a
California Court of Appeal held that a Title X clinic could permissibly be
required to report the consensual sexual activity of a minor as child abuse
where there was a significant age disparity among the sexual partners in-
volved in the consensual activity.
242
2. Increased Prosecution of Statutory Rape
A more prevalent means of implementing the strategy of reducing
teenage pregnancy by criminalizing consensual adolescent sexual activity
is the recent revival of statutory rape prosecution. The notion of using
statutory rape laws to reduce teen pregnancy was articulated as early as
1981, in the Supreme Court case Michael M v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County.243 In Michael M, the Court accepted the "justification for the
[statutory rape] statute offered by the State ... that the legislature sought
to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies. ' 244 Citing the infamous Alan
Guttmacher Institute report of 1976, the Court stated: "We are satisfied
not only that the prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one of
the 'purposes' of the statute, but also that the State has a strong interest
in preventing such pregnancy," particularly because the "illegitimacy [of
the resulting children] makes them likely candidates to become wards of
the State., 245 Thus the Court used the rationale of cutting costs to the
state as one reason to uphold a strict liability statutory rape law that di-
minished adolescent privacy rights. 24
6
239. See id.
240. Id. at 380.
241. 249 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1988)
242. See id. at 766-767, 769-70. "We hold that the [Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting] Act does not
currently require the reporting of voluntary sexual conduct between minors under age 14 both of
whom are of a similar age. However, the Act requires the reporting of sexual conduct between a
minor under age 14 and a person of a disparate age, where the conduct is reasonably suspected
to constitute a violation [under the Act]." Id. at 769.
243. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
244. Id. at 470.
245. Id. at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
246. While the facts of Michael M, which more closely resemble facts of a rape case than a statutory
rape case, may have played some factor in the outcome of this case, the point I wish to make is
that the Court accepted reducing teenage pregnancy as a justification for the creation of a strict
liability statutory rape law.
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Nearly fifteen years later, at the direction of the federal govern-
ment, states dusted off their seldom-used statutory rape laws in order to
achieve welfare reform goals.247 To reduce teenage pregnancy and welfare
costs, states began to prosecute even consensual adolescent sexual activity
as statutory rape.248 The federal welfare reform legislation, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), also explicitly "reflect[ed] the belief that teenage pregnancy
can be reduced through stricter enforcement of [statutory rape] laws., 249
Among its provisions, the PRWORA "mandates the establishment of a
program to study 'the linkage between statutory rape and teenage preg-
nancy, particularly predatory older men committing repeat offenses."'
250
In addition, state grant money is contingent upon each state providing a
plan to reduce teenage pregnancy and illegitimacy. Each plan must address
how the state intends to "[c]onduct a program, designed to reach State
and local law enforcement officials, the education system, and relevant
counseling services, that provides education and training on the problem
of statutory rape."25 1 By linking statutory rape prosecution to reducing
teenage pregnancy as part of PRWORA, Congress limited the sexual
autonomy of adolescents by "assum[ing] that few teenage women are get-
ting pregnant or raising children by choice; rather they become pregnant
because they have been victimized by 'predatory older men."'
25 2
As a result of this federal government mandate, states including Cali-
fornia, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have significantly
stepped up their prosecution of statutory rape in an effort to reduce teen-
age pregnancy.253 For example, in California, former Governor Pete Wil-
son created the Statutory Rape Vertical Prosecution Unit in 1995,
247. See Donovan, supra note 230, at 30; Weinstein, supra note 26, at 124.
248. See Weinstein, supra note 26, at 127.
249. Id. (citing PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 906, 110 Stat. 2105, 2349-50 (1996)). The issues of
statutory rape prosecution and the reduction of teenage pregnancy in the context of welfare re-
form efforts are massive and far exceed the scope of this article. I merely include this informa-
tion to help explain the origin of the revival of statutory rape prosecution. For a more complete
discussion, see, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 26.
250. Id. at 124 (citing PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 906, 110 Stat. at 2349-50 (1996)).
251. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 42 U.S.C.A. §
602(a)(l)(A)(vi) (West 1998). See also Weinstein, supra note 26, at 124 (citing PRWORA, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2114 (1996)).
252. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 127 (citation omitted).
253. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, STATUTORY RAPE VERTICAL PROSECUTION, THIRD-
YEAR REPORT (last modified Jan. 1999) <http://www.ocjp.ca.gov/pub-srvprpt.htm>; FLA.
C.S./H.B. 543 & 1317 (1997) (visited April 1, 1999) <http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/index.asp> (re-
vising Florida sentencing guidelines for statutory rape); Miss. S.B. 2362 (1998) (visited Apr. I,
1999) <http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/1998/history/SB/SB2362.htm> (creating Mississippi crime of
unlawful sexual intercourse); TENN. S.B. 1746 (1997) (visited Apr. 1, 1999)
<http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/bills/100gahtm/I00_bill/ SB1746.htm> (increasing Tennessee
health provider reporting requirements for suspected statutory rape); Tommy G. Thompson,
Governor Adds Resources to Fight Teen Pregnancy (Press Release, June 12, 1998)
<http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/98pr/Teen/20pregnancy.htm> (visited Apr. 1, 1999) (describing
Wisconsin Governor's new pilot program to increase statutory rape prosecution).
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specifically to increase prosecution of statutory rape in order to reduce
teenage pregnancy.254 From 1995 to 1998, this unit spent over nineteen
million dollars on decreasing statutory rape, filed 5,379 cases, and came
away with 3,818 convictions statewide. 2"
While there are, of course, legitimate cases of nonconsensual statu-
tory rape by "predatory older males" that should be prosecuted, the na-
tionwide effort to revive prosecution of statutory rape has resulted in
further restrictions on the reproductive privacy rights of teens. One Cali-
fornia county prosecutor's office advertises: "Spread the word that all
reports of statutory rape are being evaluated and in appropriate cases
charges are being filed. 256 Like a parental notification requirement for
federally funded contraception, this statement seems intended to deter
teenagers from sexual activity in general. Yet in so doing, both parental
notification requirements and aggressive statutory rape prosecution create
a chilling effect that significantly burdens a minor's ability to exercise her
reproductive privacy rights, based on an illogical and simplistic justifica-
tion that making it difficult to obtain contraception or criminalizing
adolescent sexual activity will stop such activity.
CONCLUSION
The success of the Parental Notification Act of 1998 in the House of
Representatives marks the current diminished state of adolescent privacy
rights in the United States. Mandating both parental notification for con-
traception and compliance with state child abuse and rape reporting laws,
the Act reflects the modem dominance of dual conservative strategies for
reducing teenage pregnancy: deterring adolescent sexual activity by man-
dating parental involvement and abstinence, while simultaneously crimi-
nalizing consensual sexual relations among adolescents.257
254. See OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, STATUTORY RAPE VERTICAL PROSECUTION, THIRD-YEAR
REPORT (last modified Jan. 1999) <http://www.ocjp.ca.gov/pub-srvprpt.html>.
255. See id. at 1-9.
256. STATUTORY RAPE PROSECUTION UNIT, EL DORADO COUNTY, CAL., STATUTORY RAPE VERTICAL
PROSECUTION (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://co.el-dorado.caus/eldoda/statutory.html>.
257. Symbolic of these merging strategies, sponsors seized upon an extreme case to foster sympathy
with their dual proposal, linking parental notification for contraception with statutory rape. Spon-
sors of the 1998 Act claimed they proposed the bill after a 37 year-old junior high school teacher
took a 13 year-old girl with whom he was having sexual relations to the McHenry County Health
Department, in Illinois, to receive birth control injections. In 1997, the teacher pled guilty to
charges of criminal sexual assault and child pornography, for which he was sentenced to ten
years in prison. Due to parent protest, McHenry County tried to drop the $47,800 Title X grant
from its health department budget. After one unsuccessful attempt, the Board of Health agreed to
forego Title X funding in the summer of 1998, and instituted its own parental notification re-
quirement. Teenagers in McHenry County, Illinois must now notify their parents before they may
receive contraceptive services from the County Health Department-services which are no
longer funded by Title X. See 144 CONG. REc. E179 (Feb. 12, 1998); Stanek, supra note 6.
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Since the creation of Title X in 1970, Congress has moved from view-
ing minors as independent actors entitled to confidential access to contra-
ception, to viewing them as children whose rights are less important than
the authoritative interests of their parents and the state. At the same
time, the Supreme Court has moved from requiring some intermediate
level of scrutiny to justify state impositions on a minor's right to repro-
ductive privacy, to allowing increasing burdens upon this right, as long as
they are rationally related to any state interest. As a result of these
changed legislative and judicial visions of adolescent privacy rights, it is
possible that the 1998 Act or another similar amendment to Title X
mandating parental notification for minors to receive contraception will
pass through Congress and be upheld by the Court in the future.
In order to prevent such a parental notification requirement from be-
coming law, voters and legislators will have to pay close attention to ef-
forts by sponsors of the 1998 Act to amend Title X, to ensure that the
amendment does not pass through Congress, or that the language does not
so closely mirror parameters accepted by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of parental consent requirements for abortion. Tragically, mandatory
parental notification will deter teens from going to Title X clinics and
likely result in a massive increase in teenage pregnancy,25 thus defeating
the one goal upon which both liberals and conservatives involved in fam-
ily planning legislation had agreed.
258. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
